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Abstract
This paper presents a dynamic, stochastic game-theoretic model of financial fragility.  The
model has two essential features.  First, interrelated portfolios and payment commitments forge
financial linkages among agents.  Second, iid shocks to investment projects’ operations at a single
date cause some projects to fail.  Investors who experience losses from project failures reallocate
their portfolios, thereby breaking some linkages.  In the Pareto-efficient symmetric equilibrium
studied, two related types of financial crises can occur in response.  One occurs gradually as defaults
spread, causing even more links to break.  An economy is more fragile ex post the more severe this
financial crisis.  The other type of crisis occurs instantaneously when forward-looking investors
preemptively shift their wealth into a safe asset in anticipation of the contagion affecting them in the
future.  An economy is more fragile ex ante the earlier all of its linkages break from such a crisis.
The paper also considers whether fragility is worse for larger economies.
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System.Financial fragility is, to a large extent, an unavoidable consequence of a dynamic
capitalistic economy.  Its fundamental sources … cannot be eliminated by government
intervention, and attempts to do so may create more instability than they prevent.
[Calomiris, 1995, p. 254]
[T]he Great Depression, like most other periods of severe unemployment, was
produced by government mismanagement rather than by any inherent instability of the
private economy.  [Friedman, 1962, p. 38]
If [someone] would only fully specify any one financial-fragility model …, perhaps we
could think more clearly about the potential scope of the argument.  [Melitz, 1982, p.
47]
I.  Introduction
An economy exhibits financial fragility if it possesses a propagation mechanism that allows
small, common economic disturbances to have large-scale effects on the financial structure and thus
on real activity.  The notion of fragility originated with Fisher’s (1933) and Keynes’ (1936) theories
of how the debt financing of investment activity that characterizes modern capitalism can be
destabilizing.  Despite the considerable controversy that has existed ever since over whether modern
capitalist economies are inherently fragile, the literature on fragility has lacked a fully coherent model
that could provide some insights.
1  The goal of this paper is to develop a model in which fragility is
well defined and to explore the factors that determine how fragile an economy is and whether
fragility worsens as an economy increases in size.
Two features seem essential to any model of financial fragility.  First, the economic
environment must drive agents to take actions that forge links between their financial positions and
the positions of others.  Second, the environment must drive agents to take actions that break those
links, in some cases completely, and in others only to a limited extent.  The model presented in
Section II minimally embodies these features.
To capture the first feature, the model gives rise to interrelated portfolios and payment
commitments that create financial linkages among agents.  There are two types of agents:  investors
and entrepreneurs, possibly many of each.  Investors choose investment strategies—rules
                                               
1 There is a considerable literature on financial crises, which will be reviewed at the end of this section.  Discussions of
fragility are either absent from it or purely informal.  Much of the literature on fragility is attributable to Minsky (e.g.,
1977), but he does not present a formal model either.2
determining whether they hold their wealth in a safe, noninterest-earning asset or make risky loans to
entrepreneurs at the market interest rate.  The assumptions on preferences and technology lead
investors to choose portfolios that are linked in the sense that the return on an investor’s portfolio
depends on the portfolio allocations of other investors.  These linkages collectively constitute the
economy’s financial structure.  Because agents only know their own portfolios and not other agents’,
they do not know to whom they are linked.
Randomness enters the model through independent and identically distributed shocks to
projects’ operations.  These shocks are allowed to occur only at a single date, and the economy’s
response to them is traced over time.  The shocks cause come projects to fail, generating the second
desired feature, namely that some linkages come undone.  When projects fail, the projects’
entrepreneurs default on their loans, which causes some investors to suffer losses on their portfolios.
In response, the affected investors reallocate their portfolios.  They choose to hold the safe asset
rather than renew their loans, thereby breaking their financial links to other investors.  Because of
these portfolio reallocations, some entrepreneurs cannot fund the continued operation of their
projects and thus default themselves.  The process continues until a new steady state is reached, with
no further defaults or portfolio reallocations.
Sections III and IV consider financial crises and fragility.  A financial crisis is a breakdown of
the economy’s financial linkages, a collapse of all or part of the financial structure.  The scenario
described above is of one type of financial crisis that can occur in the model:  actual defaults and
losses spread as investors reallocate their portfolios in response to past losses incurred.  These crises,
studied in Section III, can arise if investors do not foresee the possibility of contagious defaults
affecting them.  They suggest evaluating fragility from an ex post perspective, that is, in terms of the
severity of the crisis realized as a result of the shocks experienced.  This approach to fragility seems
natural and in fact is the one that has typically been taken.  But the model teaches that the severity of
the resulting crisis is random, so using an ex post approach will never yield a definitive conclusion
about an economy’s fragility.  The next crisis realized can always be dramatically different from all
past crises.
In Section IV, the problem of allowing investors to foresee contagious defaults is discussed,
and the economy’s financial crises and fragility are reconsidered.  Allowing foresight proves to be
difficult because if the state is too informative, investors can figure out much about the economy’s3
linkages and contagion risk.  They will condition on this additional information in forming
expectations of the returns from various portfolios.  This occurs even with a narrow definition of the
state, but the resulting conditional expectations are tractable.
If investors have foresight, a second type of financial crisis is possible.  It occurs when all
investors simultaneously shift entirely from risky assets to the safe asset in anticipation of defaults
possibly affecting them.  Like the other type of crisis, this one is caused at root by fundamentals,
namely the distribution of shocks, portfolio linkages, and the returns from various portfolios.  This
crisis also suggests evaluating fragility from an ex ante rather than an ex post perspective by asking
how soon an economy’s financial structure would collapse completely from such a crisis if shocks
were to hit at some date.
Because one goal of this paper is to determine whether the economy is in some sense
inherently fragile, attention is restricted to equilibria with foresight in which the economy has the best
chance of surviving financial crises with its financial structure intact.  In such equilibria, investors
maintain diversified but risky portfolios as long as possible, given that other investors maintain theirs.
Under the equilibrium strategies, investors maintain their portfolios if the amount of time that has
passed does not exceed a state-dependent threshold.  That threshold date is the first date at which the
economy experiences a crisis caused by individuals simultaneously shifting to the safe asset.  The
earlier that date is, the more fragile is the economy.  That date depends on the features of the
environment that interact to determine which portfolios investors prefer:  the utility function and
degree of risk aversion, the discount factor, the rates of return on the various assets, the riskiness of
the assets, and the degree of diversification possible.  The use of an ex ante notion of fragility thus
yields an unambiguous measure of fragility.
A related issue is how ex ante fragility depends on the size of the economy.  A larger
economy in the context of the model is one with more investment projects, entrepreneurs, and
investors.  As an economy increases in size, opportunities for portfolio diversification typically
increase, which contributes to reduced fragility.  But as portfolios become more diversified, they also
become more interconnected, so the failure of a project somewhere in the economy can spread to
more agents.  It is shown in Section IV that for a sufficiently large economy, fragility worsens as the
economy becomes even larger, holding fixed the degree of diversification.  An implication of this
finding is that studying the fragility of only small economies can be misleading.  Section V modifies4
the economy of Section II to allow for greater diversification, holding fixed the degree of
interconnectedness, and shows by way of an example that greater diversification reduces financial
fragility.  Section VI considers institutional responses to fragility, and Section VII presents some
concluding remarks.
Since there is a large literature on financial crises, it is appropriate to discuss this paper’s
connection to that literature before moving on to describe the model more fully.  One part of this
literature generates crises from herd behavior—agents copy other agents’ actions because they think
the others have better information (e.g., Banerjee 1992, Bikhchandani et al. 1992, and Chari and
Kehoe 1997).  While limited information also is critical to the crises in this paper, here agents do
what maximizes their expected utility given that other agents behave in ways that make crises least
likely.  A second subset of the literature on financial crises generates crises from asymmetric
information between borrowers and lenders (e.g., Mishkin 1991).  In that literature, borrowers are
assumed to have private information about the investment projects they wish to operate, resulting in
an adverse selection problem.  In contrast, in this model expected and realized project returns are
known to all agents.  The only private information here concerns investors’ portfolios:  each investor
knows his own portfolio but not those of other investors.  With this limited knowledge, investors
cannot determine to whom they are linked or their true exposure to contagion risk.  A growing
literature on evolutionary games also examines contagion.  That literature typically posits an
exogenous structure in which each agent strategically interacts with other agents positioned
sufficiently close to him.  Some types of behavior are shown to spread rapidly under certain
behavioral rules (see, for example, Morris 1997 and the references contained therein).  Agents in the
evolutionary-game literature tend to be either myopic or boundedly rational, and thus only react once
new behavior directly affects them.  In contrast, this paper considers forward-looking and perfectly
rational agents who anticipate the spread of defaults and so may take preemptive action to protect
themselves.  A fourth subset of the literature worth mentioning generates financial crises from
extraneous randomness, or sunspots.  This literature has had considerable success in explaining the
Great Depression and the more recent Mexican debt crisis (see Cooper and Corbae 1997 and Cole
and Kehoe 1996, respectively).  Fragility certainly could be studied in a model with sunspot-driven
crises, but here the focus is on crises driven by fundamentals, as in Atkeson and Ríos-Rull (1996),5
Allen and Gale (1996), and Kiyotaki and Moore (1997a,b).
2
Of the entire financial crisis literature, the papers of Rochet and Tirole (1996), Kiyotaki and
Moore (1997a), and the very recent Hiroshi, Green, and Yamazaki (1997) are the closest in spirit to
this paper.  In those papers as in this one, financial linkages exist and can be broken by routine
economic shocks that propagate through the linkages.  Rochet and Tirole posit a set of exogenous
linkages among banks engaged in interbank lending.  The failure of a single bank due to a small
liquidity shock can lead to the closure of all banks in the economy.  Kiyotaki and Moore model an
economy with many small, entrepreneurial firms reliant on trade credit.  Extensions of trade credit
link the firms, and shocks to some firms’ returns can cause defaults that can propagate and cause a
generalized recession.  Because the model is very general and its linkages endogenous, the pattern of
linkages is not determined and the evolution of financial crises is not transparent.  This is not the case
in the Hiroshi, Green, and Yamazaki paper, which is very similar but focuses on payment
commitments that arise from transfers of goods among just three or four exogenously linked traders.
The salient feature common to these three models is that the agents are not anonymous:  they know
to whom they are lending and thus to whom they are linked.
This paper, in contrast, models well-known firms that issue debt in a perfectly competitive
credit market and investors who are unknown to one another.  The focus is on the financial linkages
that arise endogenously despite considerable anonymity and on what happens as the economy gets
large.  An even more important distinction between this paper and the alternatives is that the latter
are all silent on the subject of fragility, while this paper’s goal is to define and characterize the
fragility of an economy.
II.  The Economy
The economy described here is very primitive, having only the features necessary to forge
                                               
2 More specifically, the model in this paper assumes that shocks—presumably real shocks—to projects’ operations
cause projects to fail at the initial date, and that insufficient funding causes projects to cease operation at later dates.
The financial crises associated with these events do not require that projects fail for these reasons.  Rather, financial
crises will arise in the model as long as project failures, no matter what their cause, induce portfolio reallocations that
spread through portfolio linkages.  Thus, the model could be modified so that the financial crises studied could be
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has called “irrational exuberance.”  See Lagunoff and Schreft (in progress).6
financial linkages among agents.  Specifically, the economy drives agents to choose minimally
diversified portfolios whose returns depend on the portfolios of other agents.  Payment commitments
arise out of the asset purchases associated with the portfolio choices.  Idiosyncratic shocks to some
assets result in some payment commitments going unfulfilled, which causes losses on portfolios
consisting of those assets.  Holders of those portfolios reallocate their wealth to regain an optimal
asset mix, and in the process undo some financial linkages.
Despite the simplicity of the portfolio-choice problem, the model permits numerous financial
structures—patterns of linkages—to form.  It turns out that the return on an agent’s portfolio
depends on the agent’s position in the financial structure and on the portfolio’s contents.
Conveniently, each possible position falls into one of five categories, which makes solving for agents’
investment strategies—their rules for how to allocate their portfolios—tractable.  The remainder of
this section describes the physical environment in detail, characterizes the financial structures that can
arise, and discusses the situations in which agents can find themselves within any financial structure.
A.  Agents, Preferences, Endowments, and Technologies
Time is discrete and continues forever, and at each date the economy is populated by k
infinitely lived agents of each of two types:  entrepreneurs and investors.  At the initial date, t = 0,
each entrepreneur has access to a risky investment project but has no funds with which to operate it.
Funds are objects called “dollars,” which may be money but need not be.  Each investor has funds
that he wishes to invest to support consumption in future periods, and he has access to a safe,
noninterest-earning asset in which he can invest directly.  He also has the option of making risky
operating loans to entrepreneurs that offer the chance of a higher return.
More specifically, at each date an entrepreneur’s project yields a random return of R(N)
dollars per dollar invested, where N denotes the total number of dollars invested.  Each project can
be operated only if it has sufficient funding.  For simplicity, the critical level of funding—the level at
which projects pay the maximum return per dollar, R , is taken to be $2.  Projects that have less than
two dollars invested in them pay a gross return per dollar of zero.
3  Once a project has been
                                               
3 Technologies with a minimum scale of operation have long been used in the literature on financial intermediation.
See Diamond (1984).7
insufficiently funded, it becomes inoperable at all future dates.  When a project is overfunded, with
more than two dollars invested in it, decreasing returns are realized and the project yields a return
per dollar of 2 R /N.
At date 0 only, there is a second way by which a project can become inoperable.
Independently and identically distributed shocks can hit projects, causing them to fail and pay a zero
return.  A shock hits a project with probability p,  p˛( , ) 0 1 .  Once a project fails, it is forever
inoperable.  If a project succeeds at date 0, it pays a return that depends on the amount invested, as
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where 1 < R < 1.5.
4  An entrepreneur, however, has no funds to finance his project’s operation, and
thus must obtain loans from investors.
5
Each investor is endowed with two dollars at the initial date and has preferences defined over
wealth consumed, c, at each date.  To fund consumption throughout his life, an investor chooses at
the beginning of each date a portfolio consisting of safe and risky assets.  The economy’s single safe
asset always yields a return of one dollar per dollar invested.  The risky assets are loans to
entrepreneurs, who are assumed to be price takers in the loan market.  Without loss of generality, all
loans are assumed to be for one period.
6
The timing of economic activity, illustrated in Figure 1 below, is as follows.  At the start of
                                               
4 Two comments are appropriate.  First, the assumption that the shocks are iid differs from that often made in models
of financial crises; typically shocks are perfectly correlated (e.g., Allen and Gale 1996).  Since the objective here is to
assess whether economies are inherently fragile, the assumption that shocks are iid is preferable because it gives the
economy its best chance of avoiding being labeled “fragile.”  Second, the restriction of  R  to be less than 1.5 ensures
that investors’ interest earnings are always less than a dollar and thus that investors never find themselves with more
than $2 to invest.
5 The entrepreneurs are uninteresting in this model.  They simply take funds lent to them and operate projects.  The
model works identically if the entrepreneurs are omitted and investors fund and operate projects directly.  The reason
for having entrepreneurs in the model is to introduce indirect finance, debt, and default, which better matches the
stories underlying the financial-fragility literature.  However, the nonessential nature of the entrepreneurs indicates
that debt and default are not essential to fragility.
6 Nothing in the physical environment requires that loans be for only one period.  Allowing long-term loans would not
affect the model’s results because all entrepreneurs’ projects are identical ex ante, so investors who choose to lend for
multiple periods have no incentive to change the set of entrepreneurs to whom they lend.10
necessary to hold fixed the degree of interconnectedness.
B.  Chains and Chain Structures
The solution to the investor’s portfolio-choice problem is of critical concern here because the
objective is to model linkages among investors’ portfolios.  The investor’s problem as specified thus
far, however, does not pin down which portfolio will be chosen.  Three additional assumptions are
needed regarding investors’ preferences over various portfolio allocations.  The first is
ASSUMPTION 1.  At t = 0, an investor with $2 prefers a maximum-return diversified loan portfolio, a
portfolio (1,1,0) with both loans made to entrepreneurs who end up receiving full funding, to any
other feasible portfolio.
Assumption 1 accomplishes two objectives:  It defines a maximum-return diversified loan
portfolio, and it implies that an investor who holds such a portfolio at the beginning of t = 0 chooses
not to reallocate his portfolio before the shocks to projects are realized.  Because the objective here
is to study situations in which the iid shocks initiate the dismantling of portfolio linkages, in what
follows it is also assumed that all investors start date 0 holding such portfolios.  That is, each
investor initially lends $1 to each of two entrepreneurs, and each entrepreneur receives $1 from each
of two investors.
9  This, along with Assumption 1, prevents any portfolio reallocations from
occurring at date 0 solely because investors are seeking portfolios offering higher returns.  It thus
gives the economy its best chance of avoiding being labeled as fragile.
With attention restricted in this manner, it follows that the portfolio linkages at the beginning
of date 0 can be represented with closed chains.  A closed chain is a set of entrepreneurs (and thus
investment projects) and investors such that each entrepreneur’s project is fully funded, each investor
is fully invested and diversified, and investor portfolios are all linked directly or indirectly.  Figure 2
below illustrates a closed chain.
                                               
9 It is not tractable to consider economies in which entrepreneurs differ in the amount lent to them.  Economies in
which all entrepreneurs borrow the same amount in excess of $2 differ from the economies studied here only in that
the return on projects is lower and thus that investors’ returns and consumption are lower.11
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Figure 2—A Closed Chain
More precisely, the figure shows a closed four-link chain because the chain links each
investor either directly or indirectly to four projects.  Investor A, for example, is directly linked to the
two investors nearest to him, investors B and D, because his portfolio contains loans to finance
projects 1 and 4, projects to which B and D, respectively, also lent funds.  He also is indirectly linked
to the remaining investor, investor C, because although his portfolio has no assets in common with
C’s, C’s portfolio has assets in common with B’s and D’s.
The iid shocks that occur at the initial date turn closed chains into open chains.  An open
chain is a set of entrepreneurs (projects) and investors such that at least one project is fully funded,




Figure 3—An Open Chain
each investor is fully invested but not necessarily diversified, and the investors’ portfolios are all
linked directly or indirectly.  Figure 3 above depicts the open three-link chain that results when
project 3 in Figure 2 fails.
An additional assumption is needed on portfolio preferences to determine the implications of
n = entrepreneur (project)
l = investor
n = entrepreneur (project)
l = investor12
a closed chain becoming open.  That assumption is
ASSUMPTION 2.  At each t > 0, an investor with $1 prefers holding $1 in the safe asset to holding a
single $1 loan to one entrepreneur forever.
10
Assumption 2 states that investors who at any date t > 0 find themselves with only $1 will, at the
next opportunity, shift their remaining principal ($1 each) to the safe asset.  Consequently, if, say,
project 3 fails from a shock at the initial date, then its entrepreneur will default on his loans from D
and C, failing to repay even the principal of the loan.  The losses to D and C will lead them, given
Assumption 2, to shift out of risky assets and into the safe asset.
11  The remaining entrepreneurs to
whom D and C had made loans, those operating projects 4 and 2, respectively, will then find their
projects insufficiently funded.  Since insufficiently funded projects (those run with less than $2) yield
a return of zero, the entrepreneurs operating projects 4 and 2 will default on the loans they received.
This means that investors A and B will incur losses solely as a result of the portfolio reallocations of
investors D and C.  Their losses will drive them to reallocate their own portfolios, leaving project 1,
to which they had both lent funds, with insufficient funding.
This example illustrates how the returns to each investor in a chain are affected by the
portfolio allocations of all other agents in the chain.  It also shows that the linkages in an open chain
break over time as investors rationally adjust their portfolios in response to actual defaults
experienced.  This process results in open chains disintegrating with certainty in finite time.
One further assumption on portfolio preferences will prove useful:
ASSUMPTION 3.  At each t > 0, an investor with $2 prefers shifting to a safe portfolio ((0,0,2)) over
shifting to a part-safe-part-risky portfolio (for example, (1,0,1)) forever.
Strict concavity of the utility function by itself implies that a maximum-return diversified loan
portfolio is preferred to an undiversified loan portfolio.  This, along with Assumption 1, means that
                                               
10 The outcome where the risky loan is held forever is the best one possible, the outcome yielding the investor the
highest possible lifetime return from the portfolio.  If the return on $1 in the safe asset dominates that outcome, then it
must dominate any other outcome associated with a single $1 loan.
11 This demand for the safe asset matches Keynes’ (1937) description of liquidity preference.13
in solving an investor’s portfolio-choice problem at dates t > 0, one need only compare the expected
lifetime utility of maintaining a diversified loan portfolio to that of holding a safe portfolio.  In
addition, Assumption 3 along with Assumption 1 ensures that at all dates investors who hold risky
assets do so in a way that links their portfolios to those of other investors.
There do exist preferences and parameter values consistent with an investor’s objective
function and Assumptions 1 through 3.  The proof appears in Appendix A because it depends on the
solution to the investor’s problem at dates t > 0, which is the subject of the latter half of the paper.
The concept of chains leads naturally to the concept of a chain structure for the economy.
The economy’s chain structure at any date is the combination of open and closed chains that reflects
the prevailing portfolio linkages.  That is, it is a partitioning of investors and entrepreneurs (with
their projects) into chains.  The initial chain structure, that which exists early in date t = 0, consists
solely of closed chains.  In an economy with four entrepreneurs and four investors, for example, two
initial chain structures are possible.  One consists of a single closed chain in which all investors are
linked to all projects, as shown in Figure 2.  The other consists of two closed chains, each with two
investors linked to two projects, as shown in Figure 4.  Any other structures must have at least one
degenerate
l l
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Figure 4—An Initial Chain Structure for the k = 4 Economy
chain consisting of one investor linked to a single project.  Such structures are inconsistent with
optimizing initial portfolios because the utility function is strictly concave.
This raises the question of what determines the initial chain structure.  Nothing in the physical
environment itself determines which investors hold which risky assets, so all chain structures with
investors holding maximum-return diversified loan portfolios are equally likely.  The realized initial
chain structure is taken to be the outcome of a random draw from the set of all chain structures in
n = entrepreneur (project)
l = investor14
which investors hold such portfolios.
12
At any date after the initial date, the economy’s chain structure will be a mix of closed and
open chains.  The mix depends on the shocks realized at the initial date and the strategic portfolio
choices of investors at subsequent dates.
C.  Information and Communication
The information structure is a particularly important feature of the economy, as will become
obvious later in the paper.  All agents in the economy know at date 0 how many and which projects
are potentially operable (i.e., they know k) and that the shocks at date 0 are iid.  They also know at
all dates the function determining project returns, R(N).  Portfolio decisions, however, are always
anonymous:  investors know their own portfolio allocations, but not those of other agents.  That is,
they know to whom they lent funds but not to whom other investors lent funds.  In particular, they
do not know the identities of the others who made loans to the entrepreneurs to whom they lent
funds.
13  Finally, they know the realized returns on their own investment projects at all dates.
In addition to having limited information, agents also are assumed to have limited ability to
communicate and thus to overcome the information restrictions.  Limited communication ensures
that agents remain anonymous and cannot join with other agents to share risk or prevent defaults.
An implication of the informational features of the economy is that investors do not know the
chain structure of the economy, which type of chain—closed or open—they are in, or their location
within their chain.  In particular, if they are in an open chain, they do not know how close they are to
the endpoints and thus to an impending default.
14
                                               
12 The initial chain structure could come about in other ways that also are consistent with investors having a flat prior
over structures with only maximum-return diversified loan portfolios.  For example, investors could move sequentially,
each randomly selecting two distinct projects in which to invest $1, without observing the previous selections made.  If
a choice would result in $3 being invested in a particular project, then the investor would select again.  This approach
to assigning investors to projects requires a coordinating institution that verifies how much is invested in each project
after each choice.  Thus, it is comparable to having a coordinator look over all possible chain structures and reassign
investors to projects until all chain structures consist solely of maximum-return diversified loan portfolios.
13 Thus, this model is more applicable to large, modern economies in which investors have considerable anonymity,
rather than small, village economies.
14 The information problem facing investors when allocating their portfolios is similar to that facing individuals when
choosing sexual partners when sex involves the risk of catching a sexually transmitted disease.  Individuals may or
may not know their current and past sexual partners, and they have at most limited accurate information about their
partners’ partners.  Thus, they do not know the other people to whom they are connected, either directly or indirectly,
through a string of past sexual encounters.16
This “borderline investor” has a diversified portfolio with one loan to a project that ends up fully
funded and one to a project that ends up insufficiently funded.  This portfolio yields a return of R
and current utility of u(R -1).  At the next date, this investor is an endpoint investor.
The fourth possibility is for an investor to be one of the diversified agents far from the ends of
an open chain.  This “interior investor” holds a portfolio of loans to two projects that end up fully
funded and thus receives the return 2R  and current-period utility of u(2R -2).  The investor with
this portfolio, however, faces the certain breakdown of his chain’s linkages over time.  Specifically,
an interior investor in an open r-link chain at t will be in an open (r-2)-link chain at t+1, since both
projects currently on the chain’s ends will be insufficiently funded and thus inoperable next period.
Ultimately the investor will be in the situation of a borderline investor.
Finally, an investor could be in a closed chain.  This investor holds the same portfolio as an
interior investor but will never have to reallocate his portfolio because of actual loan defaults since
his chain was not hit by any shocks at t = 0.  A “closed-chain investor,” therefore, can earn utility
u(2 R -2) for as long as he continues to be fully invested and fully diversified.
At any date, safe investors and endpoint investors know their types, which are determined
completely by their current portfolios.  Their types, in turn, give them dominant investment
strategies.  For example, there is no question that an endpoint investor, once invested in the safe
asset, will immediately consume his entire return and have nothing to invest at subsequent dates.
In contrast, the other investors do not know their types because they do not know their
locations within the chain structure.  They only know that they hold diversified portfolios, not
whether they are borderline, interior, or closed-chain investors.  In what follows, then, they all will be
referred to as “diversified investors.”  They can calculate, however, the probability of being a
particular type, and their strategies will depend on these probabilities and the expected returns of the
associated portfolios.
E.  Financial Crises and Fragility:  An Introduction
It remains to explore the financial crises that can arise and their implications for fragility.  A
financial crisis is a breakdown of the economy’s financial linkages, a collapse of all or part of the
chain structure, and arises from actions taken in response to shocks realized.  To study financial17
crises, this paper looks at how the shocks at t = 0, when the economy is in a steady state, work their
way through the economy until another steady state is reached.  In a steady state, all investors’
portfolio allocations remain unchanged, the projects in operation and their returns remain unchanged,
and thus investors’ wealth and consumption remain unchanged.  The larger the share of the chain
structure that collapses during the transition to the new steady state, the more severe the crisis
initiated by the shocks.  An economy that experiences a complete collapse of its chain structure has
no portfolio links intact in the new steady state.  In contrast, an economy that experiences only a
partial collapse has some closed chains remaining in the new steady state, but fewer than at the initial
date.  The model generates two nonexclusive types of financial crises, and thus two ways to
characterize fragility, depending on whether investors can foresee the possibility of defaults
spreading to them.
III.  Fragility without Foresight about Contagion
The simplest approach to assessing fragility involves assuming that investors do not foresee
contagious defaults.  Without foresight, investors have no reason to reallocate their portfolios at any
date after the shocks hit unless they personally experience a default.  In equilibrium, they just wait,
like sitting ducks, until defaults spread to them.
15  The outcome is one type of financial crisis:  an
actual-default crisis.  As its name suggests, this crisis arises from investors rationally reallocating
their portfolios in response to losses they have incurred from actual defaults.
The discussion in Section II of the unraveling of open chains was an analysis of an actual-
default crisis.  Any shocks that hit a chain cause investor losses, which lead to rational portfolio
reallocations, which lead to some projects having insufficient funding, further defaults and investor
losses, and further portfolio reallocations.  As defaults spread, diversified investors one by one
become endpoint investors and shift their remaining wealth into the safe asset.  Even if all investors
continue to hold diversified portfolios until they actually experience a default, any chain hit by a
shock at the initial date will collapse with certainty in finite time.
The actual-default crisis suggests one characterization of fragility.  An economy is more
                                               
15 More precisely, this is an equilibrium with subjectively rational agents who have incorrect beliefs about their
exposure to contagious defaults.18
fragile ex post the more severe the actual-default crisis that occurred in response to shocks that were
realized.  The notion of ex post fragility seems to be the one economists have used historically.  In
the literature on financial fragility, an economy’s fragility is taken to depend on the number and
severity of crises the economy experienced in the past.  This literature has yielded no clear
conclusions about fragility because there is no consensus about what constitutes a crisis or what
constitutes a severe crisis (see, for example, Kindleberger 1989 and Schwartz 1986).  The analysis
above suggests that no clear conclusions will ever be reached by analyzing ex post fragility because
the actual-default crises that generate that fragility are purely random events.  Their likelihood
depends on the economy’s initial chain structure and the number and distribution of shocks realized,
all of which are determined randomly.
If, for example, the economy initially consists of a single closed k-link chain, then any shocks
that hit the economy must hit that chain, causing all its linkages to ultimately break.  How fast the
chain collapses depends on the number and distribution of shocks.  If there are few shocks and they
hit adjacent projects, the chain survives longer than if there are many shocks uniformly distributed
around the chain.
Alternatively, a chain structure consisting of many chains, each with two people and two
projects, as in Figure 4, is the least susceptible to actual-default crises.  It allows maximum
diversification with minimum risk of defaults spreading.  With this structure, the investors in any
chain hit by a shock immediately become endpoint investors, and their chain collapses.  But investors
in chains not hit by shocks are forever safe from actual-default collapse.  As a result, the best-case
scenario with this chain structure is when there are few shocks and they hit a few chains.  The worst-
case scenario is when there are many shocks distributed uniformly across chains.  Thus, this chain
structure gives the economy its best chance of surviving with some of its linkages intact, assuming of
course that investors continue to hold diversified portfolios until they suffer losses from actual
defaults.
IV.  Fragility with Foresight about Contagion
The analysis of the no-foresight case naturally leads one to wonder what would happen if
investors could foresee the threat of contagious defaults.  With foresight, a second type of crisis—an19
anticipated-default crisis—becomes possible in addition to the actual-default crisis.  In an
anticipated-default crisis, investors simultaneously shift completely from risky assets to the safe asset
as protection against loss from expected defaults, even if they have not experienced a default
themselves.  Since all diversified investors have the same information at t, if it is rational for one to
shift to the safe asset, then it is rational for them all to do so.  The implication is that an anticipated-
default crisis involves an instantaneous collapse of all remaining chains, whether open or closed.
Unlike actual-default crises, anticipated-default crises occur by choice, not by chance.
Anticipated-default crises occur as a strategic response to the mere possibility of defaults occurring.
They arise when investors decide not to put themselves at risk of incurring losses from future
defaults.  Nevertheless, actual- and anticipated-default crises are related and endogenous equilibrium
outcomes.  An actual-default crisis leads to the complete collapse of an economy’s chain structure
only if every chain is hit by at least one shock at the initial date and if investors strategically choose
to hold diversified loan portfolios long enough for all chains to unravel completely.
Anticipated-default crises suggest a second characterization of fragility.  An economy is more
fragile ex ante the sooner its chain structure is expected to collapse if shocks hit at some date.
Although ex ante fragility is not the notion of fragility that instinctively comes to mind or that has
been used historically, it seems the more appropriate notion.  When speculating about an economy’s
fragility, one is really asking from the perspective of some initial date what would happen if shocks
were to hit the economy at some later date.  The model studied here suggests that the only clear-cut
answer to that question comes from looking at when an anticipated-default crisis occurs, since such
crises are not random events.  The sooner such a crisis occurs, the more fragile is the economy.
A.  The Problem with Modeling Foresight
The existing literature on contagion (e.g., Morris 1997) has not allowed agents to have
foresight.  It turns out that modeling foresight regarding contagion is very difficult.  The reason, at
least for this model, is that if investors have too much information about the current and past state of
the economy, they can figure out too much about the chain structure and distribution of shocks and
would condition on this additional information in calculating the expected utilities from various
portfolios.  Such calculations appear to be intractable.20
This particular problem arises if the state is taken to be the initial number of projects (k) and
the number of projects that remain at the beginning of each subsequent date up through the present.
For example, if an investor knows that k = 10, t = 3, eight projects remained at the beginning of date
1, six remained at date 2, and six currently remain, then he can figure out much about his exposure to
contagious defaults.  Specifically, he can determine that only two adjacent projects were hit by
shocks at date 0, that those projects were in a closed 4-link chain, and that that chain collapsed as a
result of portfolio reallocations at t = 2, leaving him safe from contagious defaults at later dates.
Even if the state is taken to consist of the initial number of projects and the number of
projects currently remaining, but not the entire historical path of projects remaining, an investor can
rule out many possibilities.  For example, if an investor knows k = 6, t = 2, and that four projects
remain, then he knows that at t = 0 either one or two projects were hit by shocks in a single closed 2-
link chain.  The reason is that if any larger chain had been hit by even one shock at date 0, then two
projects would have failed at date 1 from contagion, leaving three or fewer projects at date 2.  Thus,
the investor knows that any contagion that had started is over and that the initial chain structure had
to have contained at least one closed 2-link chain.
For simplicity, then, this paper takes the state to be simply the number of projects at the initial
date, k.  An investor knows the state and the current date.  In the context of this model, this
assumption is reasonable because endowments and the assumptions on portfolio preferences imply
that an investor selects a portfolio of risky assets once, at the initial date.  At all subsequent dates, a
diversified investor must decide whether to maintain his existing diversified loan portfolio, which has
been paying him the maximum return, or to shift all his funds to the safe asset.  Even with this simple
treatment of the state, investors can rule out certain outcomes (e.g., they know that they will never
be in an open 6-link chain if only four projects existed initially), but it is tractable to condition on
such information.
B.  An Equilibrium with Foresight
Given this specification of the state, a strategy for diversified investor i may be formally
defined as a sequence  f ft
i =m r, where if  f k t
ib g = 1, then the investor remains diversified at time t
if there were k projects initially, while if  f k t
ib g = 0, then the investor shifts entirely to holding only21
the safe asset.
16  This leads to the following definition of equilibrium:
DEFINITION.  A symmetric equilibrium is an identical strategy  f k f k t
i
t
* * b g b g =  for each diversified
investor i that maximizes i’s expected utility given his correct forecast  f k t
h*b g, " h „ i.
A few comments about this definition are in order.  First, there may exist asymmetric
equilibria—equilibria in which some investors behave differently than others in some states.  But
because all investors have the same preferences and information in each state, any two investors who
differ in their strategies  f
i in state k at some date t must be indifferent between remaining diversified
and shifting to the safe asset.  This indifference, however, will not generally hold except for very
special (nongeneric) parameters.  In this sense, such equilibria are knife-edged.
Second, there is a class of symmetric equilibria with the property that each investor shifts to
holding safe assets at some date t solely because he believes that others will do the same.  Such
equilibria (e.g., sunspot equilibria) represent coordination failures and are driven by strategic
behavior analogous to that which arises in any coordination game with Pareto-dominated equilibria.
While expectations do play a role in the traditional fragility literature (e.g., Minsky 1977), crises are
also driven in that literature by economic fundamentals.  This paper looks only at crises caused by
fundamentals:  actual project failures and loan defaults fuel actual-default crises, and the anticipation
of these events generates anticipated-default crises.  Neither type of crisis arises from investors
reallocating their portfolios only because they think others will do so, although they would be
collectively better off not reallocating.  Since coordination-failure equilibria are not particularly
relevant for understanding fragility based on fundamentals, the remainder of the paper works with a
refinement of the symmetric equilibrium defined above that excludes equilibria resulting from
sunspots or other coordination failures.
Under the refined notion of equilibrium, a diversified investor shifts entirely to holding the
safe asset at t when there were k projects initially, even if all other diversified investors maintain their
portfolios, as long as the lifetime expected utility from shifting, denoted v
S, exceeds that from
                                               
16 Recall that Assumption 3 makes it undesirable for an investor to have $1 in one risky asset and $1 in the safe asset.
Thus, even though such behavior is feasible, it is excluded from consideration in constructing strategies.24
Using the expression for q(r,k), the probabilities of being in a particular type of chain at any
date t ‡ 0 can be determined.  Clearly, at date 0, the probability of an investor’s being in a closed r-
link chain conditional on holding a diversified loan portfolio in state k at the start of the period,
P C E k r0 0 | b g c h, is q(r,k).  And for dates t ‡ 1, an investor can be in a closed chain only if he was in
such a chain at date 0 and no shocks hit the chain.  Thus, for any t ‡ 1, the nonnormalized
conditional probability of a closed r-link chain, denoted  P C E k rt t | b g c h, is q r k p
r , b gb g 1
2 -
-  if 2 £ r £ k
and zero otherwise (normalized probabilities will be constructed below).  The reason is that (1-p)
r-2
is the probability that none of the r-2 projects in the chain other than those in the investor’s
portfolio, which are known to have survived, were hit by shocks at t = 0.  The probability
P C E k rt t | b g c h is independent of t.
It remains to consider the probabilities of open chains.  Since no shocks have occurred as of
the beginning of date 0, the nonnormalized probability of an investor’s being in an open r-link chain
at date 0, conditional on his holding a diversified loan portfolio in state k at the beginning of the
period, denoted  P N E k r0 0 | b g c h, is zero.  But shocks have occurred by the beginning of date t = 1, so
an investor could find himself in an open r-link chain at date t ‡ 1.  There are two routes by which
this could happen.  One possibility is that the open r-link chain came from a closed m-link chain at
date 0, with m = r+1.  That is, a single shock could have hit a closed m-link chain at date 0, creating
an open chain.  The probability of a closed m-link chain at date 0 is q(m,k), and there are r - 1 ways
that r adjacent projects, two of which are in the investor’s portfolio, can be chosen from the initial
r + 1.  Thus, the probability of being in an open r-link chain at t = 1 that came from an initial closed
m-link chain, with m = r + 1, is (r-1)q(m,k)p(1-p)
r-2.
Alternatively, the open r-link chain at t = 1 could have come from a closed m-link chain at
date 0, with m > r + 1.  In this case, at least two distinct projects in the original closed chain must
have been hit by shocks and failed at the initial date, but only the two projects whose failures created
the ends of the open chain are relevant for the chain’s evolution.  Thus the probability of being in an
open r-link chain that arose in this manner is  r q m k p p
r
m r
k - - ￿
-
= + 1 1
2 2
2b g ( , ) ( ) .
It does not matter by which of these routes an investor finds himself in an open r-link chain at
t because the same utility is associated with each case.  The probabilities of the subcases can be
summed, then, to get  P N E k r1 1 | b g c h, the nonnormalized total conditional probability that at the start
of date 1 an investor resides in an open r-link chain, given that there were k projects initially and he25
still holds a diversified loan portfolio:











In calculating the probability of open chains at later dates, the possibility of contagious
defaults also must be considered.  Because of contagion, chains at dates t > 1 correspond one-to-one
with certain open chains at date t = 1.  For this reason, it is useful to first calculate  P N E k n t 1| b g c h,
the normalized probability that a diversified investor started date 1 in an open n-link chain,
conditional on his portfolio having remained intact until the beginning of some later date t, given
state k.  Clearly,  P N E k n t 1| b g c h = 0 if n ‡ k since at date 1 there could have been no open chains with
k or more links when there were only k projects at date 0.  Likewise,  P N E k n t 1| b g c h = 0 if
n < 2 + 2(t - 1) because at the start of t = 1 any chain the investor could have resided in must have
been large enough to contain the two projects in the investor’s portfolio and all projects that would
default from contagion between dates 1 and t (i.e., two per date for each date up through t-1).  The
probability of all other open n-link chains at date 1, those of sizes 2 + 2(t-1) £ n £ k - 1, conditional
on event  E k tb g, is positive and equal to  P N E k n1 1 | b g c h.
It follows that  P N E k rt t | b g c h, the nonnormalized probability of a diversified investor being in
an open r-link chain, conditional on his still holding a diversified loan portfolio in state k at date t,
satisfies  P N E k rt t | b g c h= P N E k n t 1| b g c h, where n  = r + 2(t-1).
Since each investor holding risky assets must be in either an open or a closed chain, the
possibilities considered above are exhaustive.  They can be normalized to sum to one by dividing
them by Lt k b g, the total probability weight attached to all r-link chains, whether open or closed, in
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It follows that the probabilities of belonging to closed and open r-link chains, respectively, are
P C E k
P C E k k r k
rt t
rt t t |
| b g c h b g c h b g
=







r q(r,4) P C E rt t | 4 b g c h
for all t










b g c h
b g c h
1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
2 0.75 0.75 0.000025 0.75 0.000025 0.75375 0.0
3 0.0 0.0 0.00495 0.0 0.00495 0.0 0.0
4 0.25 0.245025 0.0 0.245025 0.0 0.24625 0.0
L1 4 b g=1.0 L 2 4 b g=0.995025
Table 1—Probabilities of Chains for the k = 4 Economy
initial date (the q(r,k) values) are consistent with the discussion in Section II of possible chain
structures for this economy.  Columns 3 and 4 of the table show the nonnormalized conditional
probabilities of closed and open chains, while columns 5 through 8 show the corresponding
normalized conditional probabilities.  Open chains are possible at date 1 (column 6), but not at date 2
(column 8).  No diversified investor can be in an open chain at date 2 because the largest open chain
that occurs with positive probability at date 1 is a 3-link chain.  By date 2, that chain will have lost
enough links that the only person remaining in it will be an endpoint investor.  L 2 4 b g spreads the
probability weight that had been assigned to open chains at date 1 across closed chains at date 2.
The expected utility from remaining diversified in the k = 4 economy is shown in the third
column of Table 2 below.  It initially exceeds the expected utility from shifting to the safe asset
(column 2) and converges to the expected utility from being in a closed chain by date 2.  That result
corresponds to the zero probability of open chains as of date 2.33
ASSUMPTION 4.  At t = 0, a maximum-return diversified loan portfolio, one with three $1 loans to
distinct entrepreneurs who end up fully funded, is preferred to any other feasible portfolio.
Thus, investors are more diversified in this modified economy in that they hold 33 percent of their
wealth in a loan to a particular project versus 50 percent in the economy studied above.  The degree
of financial linkage can be held fixed by maintaining Assumptions 1 through 3, holding k constant,
and assuming that portfolios are such that chains are still symmetric.
With these assumptions, the initial chain structure when k = 4, for example, will necessarily
be a single closed four-link chain (the chain structure shown in Figure 4 is ruled out now because it
does not allow sufficient diversification).  This structure could look as illustrated in Figure 8 below.
Each investor is directly linked to the project on his left and the two closest projects on his right.
It is readily apparent, given the assumptions on preferences, that the single closed four-link
chain structure is less subject to financial crisis when there is greater diversification because only a
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Figure 8—The Effect of Greater Diversification on a Closed Four-Link Chain
subset of the possible realizations of shocks can initiate an actual-default crisis.
20  With an actual-
default crisis less likely, an investor’s probability of being in an open chain after the initial shocks is
lower, making an anticipated-default crisis less likely too.  Specifically, if only one project in the
economy, say project 4, is hit by a shock, then investors A, B, and D suffer portfolio losses.  By
Assumptions 2 and 3, however, they will keep their remaining wealth invested as is.  Since no
portfolio reallocations occur, no losses spread to investor C.  And the chain remains closed, as
illustrated in Figure 9, despite the failure of a project.  Thus, for either type of financial crisis to
                                               
20 This assumes that projects are exactly fully funded with either $2 or $3 invested and insufficiently funded with less
than $2 invested in them.34
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Figure 9—With Greater Diversification, a Closed Chain
Can Remain Closed after a Shock Hits
occur in this economy with greater diversification, at least one investor must at the initial date suffer
losses on at least two of the loans he made.  Greater diversification, then, holding fixed the linkage
structure, economy size, and preference assumptions governing when an investor reallocates, makes
an economy less financially fragile.
In general, as an economy increases in size, one would expect the degree of diversification
and the degree of financial linkage to increase.  Which dominates, the benefits of greater
diversification or the costs of greater interconnectedness, remains the subject of future research.
VI.  Institutional Responses to Fragility
Some comments on the model’s policy implications are appropriate.  The equilibria examined
here are Pareto efficient in the class of symmetric equilibria, but financial crises do occur, so fragility
is costly.  This model is very primitive, abstracting from any institutions or government policy that
might help overcome crises.  For example, mutual funds and financial intermediaries are obvious
candidates for financial institutions that would naturally arise to enhance risk sharing in this
economy.  These institutions can be introduced into the model simply by reinterpreting the individual
investors as mutual funds.  Likewise, the entrepreneurs could be reinterpreted as sectors.  None of
the model’s results, however, would be affected by these changes.  Unless all sectors and all
investors share risk, financial crises are still possible, and the economy is still potentially fragile.
Alternatively, the government could intervene to reduce fragility.  In fact, as the opening
quotation from Friedman illustrates, some economists argue that financial crises represent a failure of
government policy.  As Schwartz (1986, p. 12) puts it, “A real financial crisis occurs only when35
institutions do not exist, when authorities are unschooled in the practices that preclude such a
development, and when the private sector has reason to doubt the dependability of preventive
arrangements.”  One often-prescribed intervention is for the government to function as a lender of
last resort to prevent financial crises.  If the government controls the supply of objects known as
dollars in this model, then it can serve as a lender of last resort, lending to entrepreneurs who
otherwise would be insufficiently funded.  The government can serve this role even if it has the same
information as private agents about the chain structure and spreading of defaults; all that is necessary
is for the government to be known to all agents and able to broadcast announcements.  Given such
capabilities, if the government announces at the beginning of t = 1 that it will serve as a lender of last
resort, it can bring about a Pareto-optimal allocation.
21  The reason is that there are no incentive-
compatibility problems here:  entrepreneurs have no incentive to misrepresent themselves to obtain
extra funds to finance additional or riskier investments.  In a more general model, however, such
incentive problems would arise, and it is not clear if it would be optimal for the government to serve
as a lender of last resort starting at t = 1.
Another possibility is for the government to sell insurance against investment losses from
contagious defaults.  Investors could buy such insurance at dates t > 0.  They could pay the
premiums out of the interest income ( R -1 per dollar invested) that they otherwise would have
consumed.  The funds raised from insurance sales would keep projects with insufficient private-
sector funding in operation.  Again, there would be no incentive-compatibility problems with
providing such insurance because of the simple structure of the entrepreneur’s problem.  How high
the premium would be will depend on the solution to the investor’s consumption problem, which in
turn will depend on how risk averse investors are.  Economies with an insurance equilibrium should
be less fragile than those without because the insurance essentially allows complete diversification:  it
connects each investor to the government, and through the government to all other investors in the
                                               
21 The role for a government lender of last resort could be viewed as an artifact of the absence of outside investors from
the model.  But that view presumes that there is a financial system outside the model from which new investors could
come to take the place of those who have experienced losses.  That is, it presumes that the model economy’s financial
linkages are limited by some boundaries (e.g., national boundaries).  There is no reason for that to be the case.  In fact,
if the model is to reflect the financial fragility of a country’s economy, then it must reflect all the financial linkages of
that country’s residents.  In a world with global financial markets, it becomes more appropriate to interpret the model
as that of a global economy, and the lender of last resort as some international entity that makes up for the absence of
any outside investors and the market incompleteness caused by the assumptions of limited information and
communication.36
economy.  The insurance, of course, is just a type of tax-transfer scheme that brings about a Pareto-
superior outcome.  Solving for an insurance equilibrium remains the subject of future research.
VII.  Conclusion
This paper presents a model in which agents’ financial positions are linked through the
diversified portfolios they hold and the payment commitments that emerge from credit market
activity.  Shocks to the economy cause some entrepreneurs to default on their payment commitments
and thus some investors to suffer losses on their portfolios.  Because of the portfolio linkages,
defaults can spread through the financial system, allowing the shocks to have an impact far beyond
their place of origin.  If investors do not foresee defaults spreading to them, then a financial crisis can
occur in which the contagion runs its course, destroying some linkages.  This equilibrium suggests
characterizing fragility in terms of the severity of the resulting crisis.  This approach seems natural
and is the one typically used, but since the severity of crises is random in the model, the approach
cannot yield definitive conclusions about fragility.  If, instead, investors have foresight about
contagion, then a financial crisis can occur in which all investors seek safer portfolios as protection
against the mere possibility of future defaults.  This equilibrium suggests characterizing fragility in
terms of the speed with which the entire financial structure collapses.  The sooner the collapse
occurs, the more fragile is the economy.  The model yields a date at which such a collapse
unambiguously occurs.  That date depends on the features of the environment that jointly determine
which portfolios investors prefer.  For sufficiently large economies, the date at which total financial
collapse occurs decreases as the economies increase further in size, with the degree of diversification
fixed.  In contrast, greater diversification, holding fixed the degree of financial linkage, can reduce
fragility.  Various institutional responses to fragility are considered.  In particular, if the government
can control the supply of dollars, it can overcome fragility by serving as a lender of last resort
because no incentive-compatibility problems exist.
The model is extremely simple and makes some highly specialized assumptions to generate
minimally diversified and linked portfolios while keeping the investor’s problem manageable.  If the
only concern was with portfolio allocations, these assumptions would indeed be quite restrictive.
But here the concern is with fragility that arises from financial linkages and the propagation42
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